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Gracia, D.: 2008, Fundamentos de bioe´tica. Madrid:
Triacastela, 3rd ed. 605 pages. ISBN 978-8495840332.
Price: € 43.27.
Diego Gracia is professor of bioethics and medical
humanities at the Complutense University of Madrid, and
without any doubt the most recognized bioethicist from
Spain. This new edition of a book that has established itself
as a classic in the field, is motivated by the search for the
moral foundations of bioethics in Western societies, so as
to delineate the necessary moral conditions that are needed
for becoming a good physician. The magnitude of such an
enterprise demands the study to be conducted on a
methodical manner, therefore Gracia sets the analysis on
two main axes: one diachronic, divided in three chapters, in
which the author examines the evolution of the medical
tradition from ancient Greece until our days; the other
synchronic, also divided in three parts, where Gracia
ponders the principal philosophical attitudes regarding the
foundations of morality.
In the first chapter, Gracia explores how the beneficence
paternalistic model of family life in the ancient world was
spread to other fields of human social life, such as religion,
politics, and, in particular, medicine. In essence, the med-
ical paternalism was conceived as a process of domination
based on the moral authority that physicians held within
society.
The author then points his studies towards the modern
world, finding that the foundation of the moral law was
radically changed from a heteronomous criterion to an
autonomous standard. In modern times, the human person
began to be considered as an end in itself, thus as an
autonomous moral subject capable of taking decisions by
itself. In this perspective, the doctor-patient relationship
made a fascinating twist, moving from the emphasis on the
principle of beneficence to the emphasis on the principle of
autonomy.
The third chapter is devoted to the evolution of the
principle of justice in the Western political tradition. In this
respect, Gracia distinguishes four levels of justice that are
applicable to human acts: justice as a general virtue, justice
as a value, justice as a rational sketch, and justice as a real
experience.
In the second part of the book, the author channels his
analysis through the main philosophical attitudes so as to
provide an answer to the query of how the moral norms can
be substantiated. In this sense, Gracia examines, first the
naturalistic foundations, then the idealistic theories, in a
third moment he reviews the epistemological foundations
and, finally, he explores the axiological thesis.
In the fifth chapter, he circumscribes the research to the
ethical reasoning method, going through the ways in which
other philosophies have understood the functioning of
moral reasoning. The author starts with the ontological
approach, continues then to the deontological system,
proceeds with the epistemological theories, and culminates
with the axiological ideas.
The final chapter is entirely dedicated to the examina-
tion of the relationship between ethics and law. Gracia
recognizes that the civil society has to be based on ethical
values that can be organized under different criteria, i.e.
maximalist or minimalist.
Ultimately, the author’s intention is to demonstrate that
bioethics has to proceed respecting the level of moral
minimums in order to avoid taking decisions out of pure
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strategic convenience, and also offering a concise method
which is useful for analyzing and resolving clinical cases.
Gasto´n F. Blasi
Leuven, Belgium
Sperling, D.: 2006, Management of post-mortem preg-
nancy: legal and philosophical aspects. Aldershot: Ashgate.
208 pages. ISBN 0754643042. Price: £ 50.00.
Few obstetricians and bioethicists have ever confronted
or contemplated the management of women who became
brain-dead while pregnant. However, this uncommon
reality brings to light surprisingly varied ethical and
philosophical problems. One may call into question the
tenet according to which brain death is ‘‘death’’; this would
expose the title of the book as an oxymoron. One may
wonder whether a [brain] dead person may still be con-
sidered a patient of medicine at all. If she/it is not, shifting
the focus of care from the woman to the fetus cannot be
considered abandonment of a patient.
In this book, Dr. Sperling, currently a senior lecturer in
bio-law in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, concen-
trates efforts towards the moral and legal study of personal
autonomy over the post-mortem bodily interests of the
person, especially as confronted with the moral and legal
duties towards the unborn. The legal context of the study is
limited to the variants of Common Law in Canada, UK,
Israel and the USA. An illuminating background to this
book specific study would be Sperling’s later book,
‘‘Posthumous interests’’ (Cambridge University Press,
2008).
The power of the book stems from a skilful deployment
of casuistry, invoking analogies from organ donations and
advance directives regarding end-of-life care to infertility
treatments; from the moral and legal standing of the unborn
to regarding the body as one’s private property. The book
engages disciplines such as psychology; unfortunately, not
history, although in pre-modern times (and in contempo-
rary poor societies) post-mortem attempts to salvage the
unborn were discussed and practiced. For example, the
Talmud and its medieval exegetical literature hardly dis-
cuss abortion, but it gives much attention to post-mortem
pregnancy.
As a clinician and a philosopher I have found the
chapter on feminist relational ethics interesting and inno-
vative, especially the invocation of the metaphor of the
‘‘field’’, which is drawn from the philosophy of biology. In
this context the ‘‘fields’’ are networks of relationships
among distinctly self-organized units (Goodwin 1994).
Perhaps Sperling wishes to incorporate relational ethics in
a relatively value-free biology-based ontology. However,
the field metaphor is already part of the discourse on the
ethics of pregnancy. Talmudic and Jesuit thinkers
employed it independently and to completely different
uses. If the language chosen influences or predetermines
reasoning, as Sperling believes, broader attention to this
very metaphor is apt.
This relatively small book is so rich in analogies and
ideas that one can hardly criticize the author for selecting
out others. Perhaps some points of view are underdevel-
oped (e.g. the theological one). My reflection on the
argumentation developed in the book, and especially in the
chapter on relational analysis yields a measure of scepti-
cism. The author does not tell us why we should approach
the dilemma from a relational perspective that is anchored
in the woman, rather than in the fetus and its own ‘‘field’’.
Even if we concede that the death of the mother nullifies
her moral duties to her fetus, this does not alter our own
awareness of the unborn, its survivability, etc. When a
woman writes an advance directive of DNR even in the
face of salvageable pregnancy, she is aware of her moral
position as well.
Sperling casts the problem of post-mortem pregnancy in
terms of balancing the autonomy of the woman with the
interests and moral value of the fetus (p. 136). As an eth-
icist, he tends to assume that the maternal interests are
weightier than those of the fetus. But is it all a question of
the limits to autonomy? I think not. Consider the following
scenario: A woman requests in an advance directive that in
the case of brain-death, her organs be harvested for the
sake of transplantation, even at the expense of the life of
her fetus. Although this request is likely to save many lives
(and mere refusal of life-support saves no-one), I think
many ethicists will balk at the suggestion. Personal
autonomy is not a uniform value. It has a near absolute
power to stop the uses of one’s body, even for the sake of
lofty goals. But it is much less evident that one may donate
one’s own body for the sake of strangers at the expense of
one’s own child.
The book suffers from unpolished English styling,
occasionally to the point of confusion. However, it is a
thought stimulating book on some of the fundamental
problems and values defining bioethics. It is an excellent
source for advanced readers.
Reference
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Biller-Andorno, N., Schaber, P., Schulz-Baldes, A. (eds.):
2008, Gibt es eine universale Bioethik? Paderborn: Mentis.
250 pages. ISBN 9783897853133. Price: € 39.80.
Are ethical norms valid universally or only within discrete
geographical or cultural areas? Much academic debate in
philosophy over the past 2,000 years or so has sought to set
out justifications for particular answers to this question.
Equally, the much younger field of bioethics is concerned
with determining the reach, scope and content of ethical
norms. Bioethical analyses typically go beyond mere
armchair philosophy. Ideally, they combine sophisticated
top-down theoretical reflections with rigorous bottom-up
analysis of particular policies, practices and cases, with the
aim of furthering not only academic thinking but also to
contribute to fairer arrangements in policy and practice.
Many of the papers in the present volume make excellent
contributions in this regard.
The book is comprised of 20 individual papers (all in
German) and is clearly structured in five main sections,
analyzing the question of the universality of bioethical
norms from descriptive, pragmatic, procedural, normative
and theoretical perspectives. The first section asks whether
cross-cultural agreement on bioethical norms is necessary
for guiding practical action. The issue is explored in
regard to four topical areas: research ethics and organ
trade, the application of human rights, and the function of
bioethical debates as enabling discourse on particular sets
of norms.
The four papers of the second section examine whe-
ther there is evidence of cross-cultural consensus on key
concepts and issues: informed consent is discussed in a
comparison between Germany and Taiwan, cloning
debates are analysed by contextualizing recent research
controversies around Korean research practices, (near)
international agreement on brain death criteria among
medical professionals is contrasted with diverging views
about key concepts such as ‘body’ or ‘person’ in dif-
ferent cultural spheres. The difficulties associated with
appealing to the notion of ‘African Culture’ in support
of, or in opposition to, universal ethical values are also
discussed.
The third section concentrates on some theoretical
conceptions of universal bioethics. The first two papers
present differing answers to the question of whether moral
relativism is a coherent position or not. Some of the recent
contributions in this debate are discussed, both from a
meta-ethical and a more pragmatic and policy oriented
perspective. Two further papers in this section concern the
different metaphysical traditions of the concept of the
‘person’, and the question of the extent to which it is
desirable and possible to abandon particular notions in
practical bioethics across borders.
On a more normative level, the fourth section asks
which theoretical frameworks might be able to provide
comprehensive justification for a universal bioethics. The
first paper advocates Beauchamps’ and Childress’ Four
Principles as a suitable basis, which the second disputes,
proposing instead to focus on a purely coherentist approach
and abandoning any attempts at establishing some form of
universal common morality. The last two papers pursue
different approaches from within discourse theory.
The fifth and last section resumes a practical perspective
and addresses the question of the conditions required for
the identification of shared cross-cultural standards. The
first paper emphasises the need to distinguish between
procedural and substantive agreement, with the remaining
three presenting perspectives on particular approaches
taken by WHO, the German stem cell research ethics
commission, the Council of Europe, and relevant bodies of
the Protestant Church in Germany.
As this somewhat longish description illustrates, the
book covers a very wide and ambitious field. The editors
acknowledge in the introduction that the theme in section
four is so vast, that it would in fact require at least a whole
separate monograph to do it justice. It is not obvious why
the same should not be said for the other sections, which,
by necessity, are equally selective in the perspectives and
examples they present. Nonetheless, the book provides a
stimulating introduction and often original discussion of
the topics considered. It does not require prior familiarity
with the topic as the editors’ helpful introduction provides
appropriate guidance and context to the respective debates,




Brownsword, R.: 2008, Rights, Regulation and the Tech-
nological Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
336 pages. ISBN 978-019927680-6. Price: £ 50.00.
Roger Brownsword’s latest book, Rights, Regulation
and the Technological Revolution, is a collection of papers
dealing with issues that are at the intersection of law, ethics
and new technologies, which were originally published in
various specialized legal journals from the UK and USA.
The author, who currently serves as Director of the Centre
for Technology, Law, Ethics and Society (TELOS) at the
King’s College School of Law in London, is a leading
scholar in this area. Some readers may already be familiar
with his successful book on human dignity in bioethics and
biolaw, co-authored with D. Beyleveld in 2002. To some
extent, the present volume builds upon that work to address
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the relationship between legal regulation and new
technologies.
The book is divided into two parts. Part one, entitled
‘‘Regulatory Challenge’’, is about the dilemmas posed by
emerging technologies to policy makers who aspire to set
up regulatory mechanisms that are legitimate, effective and
sustainable. Part two, entitled ‘‘Regulatory Opportunity’’,
addresses the issue of how to manage the new opportunities
offered by technologies as powerful regulatory instru-
ments. While part one envisages technologies as an object
of legal regulation, part two regards them as a tool that
policy makers can use to enforce their decisions and ensure
greater compliance with legal norms.
Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the book’s core
concepts: regulation, rights, and community of rights.
Chapter 2 presents three competing ethics that make up the
‘‘bioethical triangle’’: utilitarianism, the human rights
perspective, and what the author calls the ‘‘dignitarian
alliance’’. Chapter 3 develops the requirement of informed
consent in clinical and research settings. Chapter 4 focuses
on the precautionary principle and on its potential appli-
cation in the field of nanotechnologies. Chapters 5 and 6
deal respectively with the challenge of regulatory effec-
tiveness, and with the problem posed by the fact that law
can be ‘‘disconnected’’ from recent technological devel-
opments. The final chapter in part one focuses on the need
to set regulatory initiatives with a cosmopolitan scope, that
is, beyond national borders.
Part two is devoted to regulatory opportunities, which
means the potential use of new technologies as regulatory
tools, that is, to influence human behaviour. After a dis-
cussion about the creation of genetic databases for forensic
and research purposes in Chapter 8, the book offers an
original distinction between two different forms of regu-
lation, which are called by the author the ‘‘West Coast’’
and the ‘‘East Coast’’ depending on whether the model
relies, or not, on a technological fix (Chapter 9). In Chapter
10, Brownsword expresses his preference for the ‘‘East
Coast’’ model, according to which the ‘‘rule of law’’ should
have pre-eminence over the ‘‘rule of technology’’. The final
chapter discusses the need for regulators to address the new
challenges in a way that increments effectiveness, but not
at the cost of the legitimacy of their decisions.
This volume makes a valuable and original contribu-
tion to our understanding of the complex interaction
between lawmakers, ethical values, and broader societal
interests in the regulation of the emerging technologies.
Clearly, the book is not for a generalist audience, but for
post-graduate students, legal scholars and policy-makers
used to think about the ‘‘regulatory challenge’’ posed by
technologies.
The only minor criticism that could be made of the book
is the vagueness of the chapters’ titles (especially in the




Schulman, A., Davis, F. D. and Dennett, D., with 20 others.
Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by
the President’s Council on Bioethics. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office. 554 pages. ISBN 978-
016-080071-9. Price: Free of charge.
Human Dignity and Bioethics, a volume of essays
commissioned by the U.S. President’s Council on Bioeth-
ics, takes on an important task: to examine whether or not
human dignity is a workable moral concept. Although
appeals to human dignity are frequent in bioethical debate,
and have also figured in reports of the President’s Council,
one sometimes suspects that such appeals are more rhe-
torical than substantive. Human Dignity and Bioethics
takes on the challenge of discovering substance in the
concept ‘‘human dignity.’’
The list of contributors extends well beyond members of
the President’s Council. The volume consists of numerous
essays expressing a variety of viewpoints and thus cannot
be justly accused of pushing an ideological or political
agenda. Rather the book exemplifies authentic intellectual
exchange. The essays taken as a whole are uneven, but one
can find in the volume a few gems. The first essay, by
Adam Schulman, does an admirable job of laying out
clearly the different sources for, and different ways of
understanding, ‘‘human dignity.’’ Some senses of the word
‘‘dignity’’ point to excellence and distinction and are ine-
galitarian, while other senses point to an inherent, perhaps
God-given, quality that does not depend on individual
accomplishment. Many disagreements within bioethics
arise as the result of disagreement about the nature of
human dignity, and quite a few essays in the volume
explore with insight the tension between these competing
understandings.
Alongside its strengths, the book also has its defects. It
is too long (554 pages) and at times tedious. The editors,
perhaps in an effort to be solicitous of all viewpoints, have
included a number of essays that do not contribute to the
caliber of the collection. The editors also invited
‘‘responses’’ to some of the essays (although not all) and
then sometimes allowed ‘‘responses’’ to the ‘‘responses.’’
Although these sorts of exchanges can be useful at a con-
ference, one wonders whether they are suited for a
published format in which authors have had the opportu-
nity to clarify their arguments in the course of revision.
Better, I think, to let readers make their own judgments,
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than to worry about giving particular authors the last word.
In the case of this volume, a few of the exchanges devolved
from reasoned pursuit of the truth into uninteresting rep-
artee. Nevertheless, the volume will prove a useful
resource for those teaching or thinking about the uses of
‘‘human dignity’’ in bioethics.
Interestingly, the volume can be ordered free of charge




Navarro, V. (ed.) 2007, Neoliberalism, Globalization and
Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality of Life.
Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing. 518 pages. ISBN
978-0895033444. Price: € 49.49.
The central thesis of the present volume, expressed by
its editor, Vicente Navarro, is that neoliberalism is nothing
more than an ideology guided by class interests. In order to
prove this thesis, the present collection of articles, all
except one chapter first published in the International
Journal of Health Services also edited by Vicente Navarro,
tries to provide empirical data contradicting the basic
assumptions of neoliberalism and neoliberal politics and
policies guiding globalization. In Part I ‘‘What is Neolib-
eralism’’, the editor establishes a general frame for the
criticism by describing neoliberalism as a class ideology
using concepts with a Marxist background (‘‘class strug-
gle’’). However, the other articles do not aim to develop a
comparable theoretical background, but try to collect
empirical data (e.g. from OECD sources) for a general
criticism of neoliberal theory and practice.
According to this general critical aim, an important part
of the volume deals not with the impact of globalization on
specific health problems, but tries to refute basic assump-
tions on the economical and social benefit of such policies.
In Part III, Robert Hunter Wade treats the problem of
growing inequality in three, sometimes overlapping articles
and tries to show the falseness of the claim that global
poverty has been recently reduced. At the same time, he
tries to provide evidence for the negative effects of grow-
ing inequality. Six articles in Parts IV, V, and VI compare
economic measures from European welfare states and the
US, including worldwide data from different periods in the
recent history, in order to prove that neoliberal policies do
not create higher economic efficiency.
Parts VII and VIII describe Venezuela’s supposed suc-
cess in the public health care system as an alternative to
neoliberalism, and the deteriorating situation in Africa
which is linked to the neoliberal policies required by
international organizations as the WMF by different Afri-
can authors. To complete this picture supposed neoliberal
policies guiding some WHO commissions and Jeffrey
Sachs’ end of poverty are attacked.
The reader, who maybe expected more about the out-
come of different health policies for concrete global health
problems, will rather find a critical overview of their
general economical and political background. But in turn,
he will be rewarded with an interesting, detailed and
empirically justified criticism of this general context by
experts from different renowned universities and academic
centers. While health inequalities and public health care
systems necessarily remain a general public concern, crit-
ical analysis and information like in the present book
should be taken into account by anybody interested in these
issues, also by those still favoring other solutions.
Hans-Jo¨rg Ehni
Tu¨bingen, Germany
Meyers, C.: 2007, A Practical Guide to Clinical Ethics
Consulting: Expertise, Ethos, and Power. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 112 pages. ISBN 978-
0742548282. Price: £ 13.99.
In his latest book, Christopher Meyers defends the thesis
that a philosopher-ethicist can act not only as a moral
expert, but also as the ‘‘best person to provide clinical
ethics consulting’’. Additionally, he sustains and grounds
that the prescriptive advice constitutes the most useful way
of practicing clinical ethics. His work, based on his back-
ground as an academically trained philosopher and in his
extended practical experience as a clinical ethicist, is
divided in four chapters. In the first one, ‘‘Clinical Ethics
Consulting and Moral Expertise’’, the author criticizes the
traditional model of clinical ethics consultation of analyz-
ing facts and facilitating discussion, and provides a direct
defense of the philosopher-ethicist as a moral expert,
capable of giving prescriptive advice. He also describes the
knowledge, skills, and training that a clinical ethicist
should have. In Chapter 2, ‘‘Principles, Rules, and Char-
acter’’, he recommends a model of ethics reasoning that
should guide the normative activities of the practice. He
illustrates that the use of the traditional principles of bio-
ethics integrated with the virtues theory can provide a real
guide to the practice of clinical ethics. In the third chapter,
‘‘Social Context and the Politization of Clinical Ethics’’, he
presents a theoretical explanation of the political nature of
clinical ethics, and the necessary interconnection between
the macro- and micro-level to make a good clinical ethics
work. In the last chapter, ‘‘Why Do Good People Do Bad
Things?’’, he focuses on the importance of the empirical
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methodology and highlights the importance of under-
standing the culture as a key element for ethical analysis.
Although many studies about the subject of clinical
ethics consultation have been written, there is still a lack of
general agreement about the exact nature of this activity, as
well as the knowledge and skills that clinical ethicists must
have. This book constitutes an excellent contribution to this
debate, and will probably become a reference work for
people interested in this field. Furthermore, his criticism to
the traditional model of clinical ethics represents an
interesting challenge to the current European practice in the
field, where the ethicist acts mainly as a moral facilitator.
In conclusion, the book presents not only a well docu-
mented defense of Meyer’s thesis, but also a comprehensive
description of the necessary tools for effective ethics con-
sulting. For those reasons, the book is targeted not only to
academics who teach ethics consultation, but also to prac-




Merkel, R., Boer, G., Fegert, J., Galert, T., Hartmann, D.,
Nuttin, B., Rosahl, S.: 2007, Intervening in the Brain.
Changing Psyche and Society. Berlin: Springer. 533 pages.
ISBN 978-3540464761. Price: € 80.20.
This book focuses on recently developed possibilities for
intervening in the central nervous system (CNS), particu-
larly in the brain, assessing the possible consequences—
both at the individual and social level. This is a genuinely
multidisciplinary book, which involves the work and per-
spectives of physicians, neurological researchers, legal
experts and philosophers, who formulate concrete recom-
mendations for dealing with these new technologies. A
merit of the book is the clarity of the extensive presentation
and discussion of many new technologies, which usually in
the philosophical as well as in the public discussion about
brain-related illness-prevention, illness-treatment and cog-
nitive enhancement are taken as given but without well
founded knowledge about it. The discussed technologies are
related to the fields of psychopharmacology, neurotrans-
plantation and gene transfer, central neural prostheses and
electrical brain stimulation for psychiatric disorders.
According to the authors—and rightly, from my per-
spective—we do not need a new kind of ethics to deal with
the challenges presented by these new technologies. For
example, in the old and famous cases related to the use of
psychopharmacology it is possible to find many of the
issues, which are ardently discussed today. The authors,
who write their book in a ‘‘consensus oriented style’’, point
out that most of the serious problems that emerge with the
new technologies discussed in this study in case of pre-
vention and treatment issues or in case of enhancement
issues are related to the social context, and accordingly to
issues about access and social justice, and not too much to
the individual context. The authors focus extensively on
issues of personal identity and personality. They come to
the conclusion that at the individual level the really prob-
lematic issues about intervention on the CNS refer to
‘‘subtle forms of mental side effects’’, which are difficult to
identify. They take an informed-consent-view, according to
which the patients knowing the possible consequences for
their psyche must decide about the treatment. If they take
the risk, then their opinions and judgements about their
quality of life after the treatment must be accepted, even if
they are the result of an adaptation process to the new
circumstances.
On the one hand this study offers an illuminating and
accessible discussion of many of the new technologies
related to actual bioethics debates. On the other hand the
normative foundations of this study are weak at least. The
authors refer to the in contexts of bioethics well known
theory of Beauchamp and Childress, and correspondingly
they ground their arguments on the four ‘‘widely accepted
general principles of medical ethics’’: nonmaleficence (that
is prohibition of harm), beneficence (that is duty to assist),
respect for autonomy, and justice. But although this is a
very popular theory in the bioethical context and a useful
one for practitioners, from a philosophical perspective its
foundations are weak: to articulate genuine solutions of
ethical problems is a different thing than to cook a meal
mixing well known ingredients to one’s own taste. A
foundation of, or at least an explanation of the normative
pretensions of the different principles is necessary, and you
have to articulate a theory to explain and make mandatory
the precedence of some principles over others in determi-
nate circumstances. In this sense the normative proposal
offered in this book suffers from the same deficiencies like
the well known theory to which it refers.
Daniel Loewe
Tu¨bingen, Germany
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